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I N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Court of Appeals No. 920407-CA

Plaintiff,
vs.

VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS CO.,
and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation,
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RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a
division or agency of the State of
Utah, PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER,
Third-Party
Defendants and
Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY

T h i r d D i s t r i c t C o u r t Case
No. C - 8 7 - 2 3 9 0

BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) D I S M I S S A L OF A T H I R D - P A R T Y COMPLAINT
BY THE T H I R D D I S T R I C T COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE YOUNG

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article XII, § 19 (1993 as amended).
Blacklisting Forbidden. Each person in Utah is free to
obtain and enjoy employment whenever possible, and a person
or corporation, or their agent, servant, or employee may not
maliciously interfere with any person from obtaining
employment or enjoying employment already obtained from any
other person or corporation.
Public Policy. It is hereby declared to be the public
policy of the State of Utah that the right of persons
to work, whether in private employment or for the state
. . . sshall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in a labor union, labor
organization or any other type of association; and
further, that the right to live includes the right to
work. The exercise of the right to work must be
protected and maintained free from undue restraints and
coercion.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-4:
Agreement, understanding or practice denying right to work
declared, illegal. Any express or implied agreement,
understanding or practice between employer and any labor
union, labor organization or any other type of association,
whereby any person not a member of such union, organization
or any other type of association shall be denied the right
to work for an employer, or whereby membership in such labor
union, labor organization or any other type of association
shall be denied the right to work for an employer, or
whereby membership in such labor union, labor organization
or any other type of association is made a condition of
employment or continuation of employment by such employer,
or whereby any such union, organization or any other type of
association acquires an employment monopoly in any
enterprise or industry, is hereby declared to be an illegal
combination or conspiracy and against public policy.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-5:
Any agreement/ understanding or practice designed to violate
chapter declared illegal. Any express or implied agreement,
understanding or practice which is designed to cause or
2

require, or has the effect of causing or requiring, any
employer or labor union, labor organization or any other
type of association, whether or not a party thereto, to
violate any provision of this chapter is hereby declared an
illegal agreement, understanding, or practice and contrary
to public policy.
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5)
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading
is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after
the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets
forth a claim for relief to v.<hich the adverse party is not
required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE DEFENDANTS7 MOTION TO DISMISS WAS AND SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED AS A MOTION TO DISMISS, NOT AS A MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A footnote on page 6 of the State Defendants' Brief contains
a cursory statement that the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
was really a Motion for Summary Judgment. However, they are
mistaken for the following reasons:
A.

The Parties Did Not Treat the Motion as a Summary Judgment
Motion.
The State Defendants' motion was entitled "The State's

Motion to Dismiss Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint,"
not "Motion for Summary Judgment," and it was filed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
No affidavits of any kind were submitted by the parties to
provide additional evidence, nor did the trial court invite any.
The oral argument transcript on the motion certainly reflects
that the parties viewed the motion only as a motion to dismiss.
Counsel for Rock Product's emphasized the difference between
State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and a motion for summary
judgment when he stated:
We are entitled to proceed with our cause of
action, to have reasonable opportunities of
discovery, to find out more about the details
in this case so that we can flush out our
4

various causes of action and then if some of
them are not totally, legally sufficient,
then to go through the motion for summary
judgment once we have got to a stage that's
appropriate in the handling of the lawsuit.
(R. 2557.)
The definite implication of this statement is that Rock
Products believed the motion to be what it was presented by the
State Defendants to be:
12(b)(6).

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

The following oral argument statement by State

Defendants' counsel indicates they too viewed and treated the
motion only as a motion for summary judgment:
[Rock Products has] made a big deal here in
argument as well as in their brief about Rule
8 of [the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure].
Well, I'd like to — we mentioned this in our
brief and I think it bears repeating again.
What Ru"1 d 3(a) says, Rule 8 requires that the
— requires "that the pleading shall contain
a short and plain statement of the claims
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.11 I mean, he can allege anything but
if it doesn't state a cause of action you
cannot stay in court on it. That's why we
have motions to dismiss. That's why there
are rules on that. And you know, I might be
able to quarrel with the clarity of their
pleadings but I don't need to. Regardless of
how clear their pleadings are they have not
stated a cause of action on any of these
counts.
(R. 2567) (emphasis added).

5

B.

The Trial Court Treated the Motion as a Motion to Dismiss.
A trial court has not treated a motion to dismiss as a

motion for summary judgment where no factual findings are made or
relied upon.

Colman

v.

Utah

State

Land Bd. , 795 P.2d 622, 625

(Utah 1990).

Like the trial court in Colman,

the trial court in

the present action only entered conclusions of law in granting
State Defendants' motion to dismiss.
At no time did the did the trial court state that it
was treating the motion as one for summary judgment.

The trial

court's order refers to the hearing on the "Motion to Dismiss,ff
the order grants the State Defendants' "Motion to Dismiss," and
the order contains no findings of fact to suggest it was a
summary judgment ruling.

(R. 773-776.)

In addition, the order

reflects that the trial court "finds and holds that as a matter
of law Rock Products' Amended Third-Part Complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted against the State
Defendants."

(R. 774.)

The trial court's order states that its

finding was made after considering only "the pleadings, the
memoranda and cases submitted, and the arguments of counsel."
(R. 774.)
Despite this, the State Defendants argue in this appeal
that the court somehow silently converted the motion to one for
summary judgment by considering "materials outside of the
6

pleadings."

(Brief of State Defendants, p. 6, n. 1.)

The State

Defendants do not state what those materials might be or to what
extent and for what purpose they were supposedly considered by
the trial court.
In addition to the complaint and answer, the only
documents filed with the trial court concerning the motion were
supporting memoranda with one appendix to a memorandum, a
contract.

Attaching a contract as an appendix to a memorandum

and incorporating it by reference does not raise the State
Defendants' memorandum and attachment above the level of
argument.

Furthermore, there is no indication that the trial

court considered any "materials outside of the pleadings."

Even

if the appendixed contract was viewed by the trial court as a
submission of material outside the pleadings, there is no basis
to assert that the trial court's ruling was based on anything
other than the pleadings.

Homart

Development

Co.

v.

W.T.

Sigman,

868 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1989).
As a general matter, a trial court's review of argument
contained in motions and memoranda does not warrant conversion of
a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.
Glanz,

See, Miller

948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991) (construing Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

The trial

court in this case did not treat the motion to dismiss as a
7

v.

motion for summary judgment as State Defendants' suggest.
C.

A Trial Court Cannot, on its Own, Convert a Motion to
Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment.
M

[A] trial court cannot on its own motion convert a

rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary
Colman

judgment."

v.

Utah

(Utah 1990), citing Hill
151 (Utah 1970).

In Hill

State

v.
v.

Land Bd.,

Grand

Central,

Grand

Central,

795 P.2d 622, 625
Inc.,
Inc.,

477 P.2d 150,
477 P.2d 150

(Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court
cannot convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment on its own initiative:
[the trial court] has no more right to ask
the plaintiff how he will establish his claim
than [the court] has to require the defendant
to state what its defense will be. It would
hcive been highly improper for the court, on
the motion to dismiss, to have given the
defendant thirty days to present proof as to
the truth of the alleged statement or as to
the lack of malice.
Id.

at 151.

Since the parties did not treat the motion to

dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, this Court should find
that the trial court could not have done so on its own accord.
D.

The State Defendants Cannot Convert Their Motion to a Motion
for Summary Judgment on Appeal.
The position taken by the State Defendants that the motion

was one for summary judgment is raised by them for the first time
on appeal.

However, it is too late for them to do so.
8

The Utah

Supreme Court in Colman,

supra,

stated that, if a trial court

cannot convert a motion to dismiss to a summary judgment on its
own, a party cannot do so on appeal. 795 P.2d at 62 5.
E.

Even if the Trial Court Did Convert the Motion to a Motion
for Summary Judgment, Such Conversion Pertains to Only One
Cause of Action and is Reversible Error.
The State Defendants do not specify what materials

outside of the pleadings were included in their motion.

As noted

above, the State Defendants presumably refer to the appendix to
their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, which is
the contract between the Board of Water Resources and the
Richards Irrigation Company.

Certainly that document has no

bearing on any cause of action other than Rock Products' cause of
action for breach of a third-party beneficiary contract.
Therefore, the motion could not be treated as a motion to dismiss
on non-contract claims.
Even though the contract was argued by both parties in
the motion, the contract attached as the appendix did not
contradict the allegations of Rock Products' claim, and it
therefore did not provide any basis to convert the motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
Int'l.,

Inc.,

See Watters

v.

Pelican

706 F. Supp. 1452, 1457, n.l (D. Colo. 1989).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss could not be properly treated
as one for summary judgment as to any cause of action.
9

Even if the trial court, without informing the parties,
treated the motion as one for summary judgment, it committed
reversible error in doing so.

Trial courts are urged to use

caution before converting a motion to dismiss to a summary
judgment motion.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated "it is

generally not well advised to treat a motion to dismiss as one
for summary judgment."

Salt

P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1977).

Lake

County

v.

Salt

Lake

City,

57 0

There was no justification in this

case to convert the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment
motion.
In addition, a proper conversion requires more than
what occurred in this case.

In Jackson

v. Integra

Inc.,

952 F.2d

1260 (10th Cir. 1991) the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, where the trial court relied upon an exhibit provided by a
defendant, the motion to dismiss should have been treated as a
motion for summary judgment and it was reversible error (1) to
not inform the plaintiff that the motion would be treated as a
motion for summary judgment and (2) to not give the plaintiff the
opportunity to gather evidence to demonstrate the existence of a
material fact. Id.

at 1261.

1562, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991).

See, also,

Miller

v.

Glanz,

948 F.2d

If, as the State Defendants

suggest, the trial court did treat all or a portion of the motion
as a motion for summary judgment, its order must be reversed
10

because it did not properly convert the motion to a motion for
summary judgment by informing the parties of its intended
treatment and affording Rock Products the requisite notice and
opportunity to present evidence of material facts.
At oral argument on the State Defendants' motion to
dismiss, counsel for Rock Products argued the impropriety of the
State Defendants' factual argument when at issue was only the
sufficiency of the pleadings.

(R. 2555-2557; 2564-2565.)

Rock

Products reiterated that no discovery had taken place and no
affidavits had been submitted in support of the State Defendants'
motion.

(R. 2555.)

Rock Products also argued that in order to

accept the arguments of the State Defendants, the trial court had
to assume facts that were not supported by evidence.

(R. 2556.)

The trial court's failure to give Rock Products any reasonable
opportunity to present material to address the intent of the
contracting parties to benefit Rock Products was improper.
F.

The Trial Court Erred by Ruling on the Intent of the
Contracting Parties.
In order for the trial court to determine the intent of

the contracting parties (R. 774), it must consider the terms of
the contract as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances.

Ron Case Roofing
1382 (Utah 1989).

& Asphalt

Paving,

Inc.

v. Blomquist,

773 P.2d

The trial court's determination of intent went

well beyond the scope of a Rule 12(b) 6 motion addressing the
11

sufficiency of pleadings.

More importantly, the trial court had

absolutely no evidence before it regarding the surrounding facts
and circumstances.

A contract appended to a memorandum provides

no information whatsoever regarding the facts and circumstances
surrounding it.
Even if the trial court did treat the memoranda as
"evidence,11 the memoranda of the parties raise ci material dispute
of fact regarding the intent of the parties.

The oral argument

of Rock Products' counsel illustrates this point as well as the
point raised in the preceding paragraph:
We have alleged, in any event, that Rock
Products is a third-party beneficiary. Now
the strange think about this whole analysis
is I think the state and us agree. The test
in that circumstance as to whether or not
there's a third-party beneficiary is whether
or not the contract between the two main
pcirties, that is the state and Richards in
this case, was intended to benefit Rock.
Well, we've alleged that there was clearly
intent to harm. The question is whether
there was intent to benefit. Your honor, I
don't know how in the world you can make that
determination until we have had a least some
opportunity to engage in some discovery.
They say there's no intent; we say there is
intent. They haven't even got a defense
anywhere that contests it. They say the
intent governs; we say intent is to benefit
Rock Products. That's it. Now we're
entitled to get involved in our discovery to
verify that. So it seems to me we are in
basic agreement on that whole [point] except
they are engaging in some factual semantics

12

that there wasn't any intent and they have
nothing to back it up.
(R. 2564-65.) (Emphasis added.)

Thus, even applying the

standards of a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings raised
material issues of fact, and the trial court erred when it did
not consider all facts and all inferences fairly arising from
those facts in a light most favorable to Rock Products.
Texas

Co.,

Young

v.

331 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1958).
If treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial court's

ruling was also improper.

As set forth in Appellant's Brief,

allegations in the complaint must be considered as true and in
the light most favorable to Rock Products.
Utah

State

As noted in Colman

v.

Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), a dismissal is a

severe measure and can be granted by the trial court only if it
is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state
of facts which could be presented in support of the claim."
also

Anderson

App. 1992).

v.

Dean Witter

Reynolds,,

Inc.,

See

841 P.2d 742 (Utah

lf

[I]f there is any doubt about whether a claim

should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue
should be resolved in favor of giving the party a opportunity to
present its proof."
Corp.,

Colman

at 624, citing Baur

383 P.2d 397, 397 (Utah 1963).

13

v.

Pacific

Fin.

POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-3 GOVERNS RETROACTIVITY OF
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS.
The State Defendants argue that a 1987 amendment to the
Governmental Immunity Act must be applied retroactively based
solely on the reasoning of Frank
1980).
Thrift

v.

State,

613 P.2d 517 (Utah

However, State Defendants fail to address Rocky
Stores

v.

Salt

Lake

City

Corp.,

Mountain

784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court refused to retroactively
apply an amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act which
provided that the management of flood waters is considered to be
a governmental function.

The Court noted that Utah Code Ann. §

68-3-3 mandates that "no part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so decldr-jn."

Id.

at 461.

It

concluded that the amendment did not fall within the exception to
this rule which permits the retroactive application of statutory
amendments

,n

when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the

meaning of an earlier enactment' or [the amendment] is merely an
x

amplification as to how the law should have been understood

prior to its enactment' . . . ."

Id.

at 461-462 (citations

omitted).
The 1987 amendment at issue expanded the definition of
"governmental function" by defining everything a governmental
entity does as a "governmental function."
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Provo

City

Corp.

v.

State,

795 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1990) (the 1987 amendment

expanded the definition of "governmental function11 by defining
everything a governmental entity does as a 'governmental
function.')

The amendment is a substantive change from the laws

that existed when Rock Products' causes of action arose.

Because

it would provide the State Defendants with a greater degree of
immunity, it must not be applied retroactively.
Thrift

at 462.

Rocky

Mountain

If an amendment stating that flood control

activities fall within the meaning of governmental function was
not to be applied retroactively to protect prior governmental
action, a sweeping amendment defining governmental function and
overturning a long history of judicial construction should not be
applied retroactively to protect a variety of prior governmental
actions. -1
POINT III
WHETHER THE STATE DEFENDANTS' ACTS CONSTITUTE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT.
The application of the pre-1987 Governmental Immunity
Act Provision to determine whether the acts Rock Products
complained of were discretionary will require the benefit of a

The reason the Utah Supreme Court retroactively applied a Governmental Immunity Act amendment in
Frank, 613 P.2d at 519, may be that the Court viewed the amendment as one of the exceptions to the rule
prohibiting retroactive application of statutes. In the event this Court deems the Rocky Mountain TJirift Stores and
Frank cases to be in conflict, the most recent case should control.
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factual record.
(Utah 1990).

Hansen

v.

Salt

Lake

County,

794 P.2d 838, 846

As is illustrated by the State Defendants' factual

arguments in their appeal brief, pp. 16-21, the application of
the pre-1987 discretionary function standard to Rock Products7
numerous causes of action raise issues of fact.
The Standiford/Johnson discretionary function test
"does not refer to xwhat government may do, but what government
alone must

do' and includes ^activities not unique in themselves

. . . but essential to the performance of those activities that
are uniquely governmental.'11

Bennett

v.

Bow VaJley

797 P.2d 419, 421 (Utah 1990), citing Rocky
Stores

v.

Salt

Lake

City

Corp.,

Dev.

Mountain

Corp.,

Thrift

784 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989)

(citation omitted; emphasis in original).

To apply the

discretionary function test to the State Defendants' conduct,
significant discovery must take place before it can be determined
if State Defendants' conduct falls within a "must do" category.
Thus, because it is premature to make such a determination, the
trial court improperly dismissed Rock Products' claims against
the State Defendants for failure to state sufficient claims.
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POINT IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE PROTECTING
FREEDOM TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT IN ARTICLE XII,
§ 19 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS SELF-EXECUTING.
In part, Article XII, § 19 of the Utah Constitution
states, "every person in this state shall be free to obtain
employment whenever possible . . . ."

Rock Products asserts that

this clause of the provision is self-executing.

Self-executing

constitutional clauses may be divisible from clauses which are
not self-executing.

In Springville

Banking

Co.

v.

Burton,

349

P.2d 157 (Utah 1960), Justice Wade, in dissent2 notes the
following quote from the Supreme Court of South Carolina:
It is within the power of those who adopt a
constitution to make some of its provisions
self-executing, with the object of putting it
beyond the power ut the Legislature to render
such provision nugatory by refusing to pass
laws to carry them into effect; and where the
matter with which a given Section of the
Constitution is divisible/ one clause thereof
may be self-executing and another clause or
clauses may not be self-executing.
Constitutional provisions are self-executing
when there is a manifest intention that they
should go into immediate effect and no
ancillary legislation is necessary to the
enjoyment of a right given and the
enforcement of a duty imposed.

2

This dissenting opinion is cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Colman v Utah State Land
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 632 (Utah 1990), in support ot its reversal ot the maiority opinion in Sp}im>\ille Banking % 349
P.2d at 159, and other Utah Supreme Court opinions, in reaching the conclusion that Article 1, Section 22 ot the
Utah Constitution is self-executing.
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Id.
Dep't,

at 161, citing Schick

Springs

Water Co. v.

State

Highway

157 S.E. 842, 847-48 (S.E. 1931) (emphasis added).

Rock

Products asserts that the first phrase of § 19 is divisible from
the rest of the provision because it states a clear,
constitutionally protected right to be free to obtain employment.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to work
embodied in § 19 is "one of the basic freedoms vouched safe by
our state constitution . . . [which] complements makes more
meaningful the other rights guaranteed as part of our
constitutional liberties."
(Utah 1952) .

State

v.

Packard,

250 P.2d 561, 563

The constitutional right to be free to obtain

employment is "mandatory and obligatory as it is" and needs no
legislation to be enforced.

See Colman,

supra

at 63 5.

Therefore, article XII, § 19 of the Utah Constitution affords a
constitutionally protected right upon which Rock Products bases,
and has sufficiently pleaded, a valid cause of action.
Although the legislature has provided criminal
enforcement for violations of § 19 (Utah Code Ann. § 34-24-1 et
seq.),

nowhe^re has the legislature limited enforcement of § 19 to

criminal enforcement.

As Rock Products has argued in its appeal

brief, criminal enforcement statutes do not limit or bar any
right which may be pursued in a civil action (R. 1006-07.)
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State Defendants' reference to the recent revision to
§ 19 does not alter the foregoing conclusion.

An amendment

eliminating the requirement that an action be raised to the level
of a crime while leaving the remainder of the constitutional
provision intact does nothing to eliminate civil remedies
available for violation of that constitutional provision.
POINT V
ROCK PRODUCTS HAS STATED A VALID CIVIL RIGHTS CAUSE OF ACTION.
A.

State Defendants Misstate the Standard Rock Products must
Meet to Establish a S 1983 Claim.
State Defendants mischaracterize the standard Rock

Products must meet to sufficiently state a civil rights claim
under Rule 12.

State Defendants argue that for Rock Products to

state a claim, it !*mast be able to show as a matter oi: lav* thai,
the State ^deliberately deprived [Karen] of his constitutional
rights./f|3

All that is required for Rock Products to state a

cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is to allege that the
State Defendants, acting under the color of state law, deprived
Rock Products of rights secured by the United States

3

The case cited by the State defendants in support ot this assertion is a curious choice. Wade v. Ha\nes
concerns a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by a corrections otticer who
attacked a prison inmate. The standard cited is a standard ot proof at trial. Even the cases cited with approval by
the court in Wade do not address motions to dismiss, but analyze motions tor summary judgment, supported by
affidavits and other evidence. Schaal v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 155, 157 (E.D. 111. 1978); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d
193, 197 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Constitution.
1986).

Gibson

v. United

States,

781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.

Rock Products has sufficiently pleaded a civil rights

cause of action in its Fifteenth Cause of Action.
B.

(R. 522-524.)

Rock Products Has Been Deprived of Property Interests by the
State's Action Without Due Process of Law as Prohibited by
S 1983 of the United States Code.
Rock Products Was Deprived of Property Interests.
In general, Rock Products has alleged that it has been

deprived of property interests without due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

(R. 522.)

Rock Products property interests are

derived from rights secured by state law.

The Utah Supreme Court

has noted that the United States Supreme Court recognizes valid
property interests which are derived from a variety of sources:
11

* [P]roperty, ' interests subject to procedural due process

protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms.
Rather, ^property' denotes a broad range of interests that are
secured by ^existing rules or understandings.'"
Inc.

v.

Utah

Liquor

Control

Comm'n,

1982), citing Perry v. Sindermann,

Celebrity

Club

657 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Utah
408 U.S. 593, 601 92 S.Ct.

2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).
Contrary to the State Defendants7 argument, Rock
Products' civil rights claim is based on much more than concepts
of breach of contract.

As noted above, Rock Products ability to
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freely obtain gainful employment, and to be free from
blacklisting, is secured by Article XII, § 19 of the Utah
Constitution and rises above the concept of mere contract rights.
See,

Local

57 v.

Cir. 1987), cert

Bechtel

Power

Corp.,

denied,

486 U.S. 1055 (1988) ("The Utah

834 F.2d 884, 889 (10th

blacklisting laws arguably confer 'nonnegotiable state-law rights
on . . . employees independent of any right established by
contract.").
The underlying policy consideration of the "Utah Right
to Work Law" is also applicable to this case.

That law states

the public policy of Utah to be that "The exercise of the right
to work must be protected and maintained free from undue
restraints and coercion."

Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-2.

By virtue of the Constitution of the State of Utah and
its statutory laws, Rock Product's right to seek gainful
employment free from coercion by blacklisting rises to the level
of a property right within the broad range of interests
constituting property.
As alleged in the Complaint, Rock Products had also
been requested by Hadfield Irrigation Company to perform
approximately $52,000 worth of work for Hadfield on a state
project to be undertaken by Hadfield.

(R. 503.)

When the State

Defendants prohibited Rock Products from performing this work, it
21

deprived Rock Products of $52,000.

Under any definition, money

constitutes property.
The further conspiracy on the part of the State
Defendants to defraud Rock Products of $34,000 worth of sand also
constituted a taking or appropriation of a property interest.
(R. 512-13.)
C.

The Action of the State Defendants Constituted a Deprivation
of Property Interests Without Due Process m Violation of
S 1983.
It is self evident that State employees acting under

color of state law to deprive Rock Products of property through
outright fraud does not meet any standard of "due process.11
Further, State employees acting under color of state law to
deprive Rock Products of its right to gainful employment and of
the benefit of its contractual dealings with Hadfield by
blacklisting--a process in violation of the constitution and
criminal statutes of the State of Utah—not meet any standard of
"due process.11 Rock Products' claims with respect to interference
with the Hadfield contract are analogous to the failure-to-hire
context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-3(a).

In those cases, generally, an employee is

protected from discrimination simply for participating in legal

proceedings.

See Ruggles

v. California

797 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1986).
22

Polytechnic

State

Univ.,

Similarly, Rock Products

asserts it has the right to be protected from retaliation, in the
form of blacklisting, simply for exercising its legal right to
enforce and/or to litigate disputes arising under The Richard
Irrigation Co.

(R. 503.)

Consequently, the State Defendants, acting under color
of state law, deprived Rock Products of rights and privileges
secured by the United States Constitution and violated § 1983 of
the United States Code.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the foregoing arguments, the Court
should reverse the trial court's Order and Judgment in its
entirety and deny the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of May, 1993.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

'DAVID L. BARCLAY
NATHAN R. HYDE

Attorneys for RoclylProducts
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